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The HOPE VI program was created to fix the public housing problem
in this country. Its mission was to select the most distressed neighborhoods
and to revitalize them with new housing and infrastructure. This
revitalization changes the makeup of the community from one of isolated
poverty to one of self-sufficiency and economic diversity. The Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is able to substantially achieve
these goals by combining federal grant money with funds from private
investors, but this is not to say that HOPE VI is without problems. In truth,
this well-intended mission has yielded some troubling results. Most notably,
HOPE VI decreases the availability of public housing in a municipality, and
in turn, many of the displaced residents cannot return to the revitalized area.
These problems, however, do not invalidate HOPE VI's mission or render
the program unworkable. HOPE VI is the only federal program that targets
and restores communities of distressed public housing. Therefore, HOPE
VI must continue its mission, but with changes that address its weaknesses.
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An effective solution is one that independently provides a supply of low-
income housing. HUD, in evaluating whether a given location deserves a
HOPE VI grant, should require the municipality to have in place a
mechanism that will balance the inevitable decrease in low-income housing.
One such mechanism is inclusionary zoning.
This paper will discuss the HOPE VI program and highlight some of the
more prominent problems in the context of an ongoing HOPE VI project in
Miami. Next, the paper will put forth possible solutions to the negative
effects that HOPE VI projects traditionally have on an area's supply of public
housing. The solution upon which this paper will focus is inclusionary
zoning.
I. HOPE VI GRANTS
A. Brief History of the Program
Congress established the National Commission on Severely Distressed
Public Housing in 1989. The Commission's duty was to identify the
severely distressed public housing existing in this country and formulate a
plan to combat the problem.i In 1992, based on the Commission's findings
and recommendations, Congress created the HOPE VI program. The
HOPE VI program targets severely distressed public housing and issues
grants to local Public Housing Authorities (PHA) for the costs associated
with demolition, the development of replacement housing, community
services, as well as construction and rehabilitation.2 Since 1992, HUD,
which administers the HOPE VI program, has awarded such grants to 166
cities.3 Congress reauthorized the program in 2003, adding protections for
tenants and encouraging the involvement of the affected residents at all
4phases of the revitalization process.
B. The Purpose of HOPE VI
The program enumerated four major objectives: (1) to improve the living
environment for residents of severely distressed public housing through the
I Nat'l Low Income Hous. Coal., HOPE VI (Feb. 8, 2006), in 2006 Advocates' Guide to
Housing and Community Development Policy, at http://www.nlihc.org/detail/article.cfm?articleid=
2772&id=46.
2 Id.
3 SUSANJ. POPKIN ETAL., URBAN INSTITUTE, A DECADE OF HOPE VI: RESEARCH FINDINGS
AND POuCY 2 (2004), at http://urban.org/UploadedPDF/411002_HOPEVI.pdf.
4 Nat'l Low Income Hous. Coal., supra note 1.
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demolition, rehabilitation, reconfiguration, or replacement of obsolete
projects (or portions thereof); (2) to revitalize sites on which such public
housing projects are located and contribute to the improvement of the
surrounding neighborhood; (3) to provide housing that will avoid or
decrease the concentration of very-low-income families; and (4) to build
sustainable communities.5 Essentially, the program attempted to improve the
quality of life of residents living in depressed housing by revitalizing the
existing housing, transforming the community into one of mixed-income,
and promoting the self-sufficiency of the residents through the provision of
a number of support services.
In theory, the HOPE VI program targets only the most depressed public
housing, that which is beyond improvement by standard rehabilitation efforts
due to a number of reasons.6 Generally, these developments are located in
predominately minority communities ravaged by high crime rates and other
problems. Also, the targeted communities are typically segregated and
7
extremely poor, and lacking in the appropriate public services.
C. Structure and Process
HUD's Office of Urban Revitalization, a part of the Office of Public and
Indian Housing, manages the HOPE VI program. As mentioned above,
HUD awards the HOPE VI grants yearly to the Public Housing Authorities
(PHA) operating distressed public housing. Additionally, HUD advises each
PHA with regard to the financing of the project and helps the PHA to
establish community and support services.8 HUD distributes the grants
based on four factors: (1) the need for assistance; (2) the ability of the PRA
to use the grant effectively; (3) the quality of the plan proposed by the PHA;
and (4) the PHA's ability to get funding from other sources to supplement
5 42 U.S.C. §1437v (2006).
6 SUSANJ. POPIKIN ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, HOPE VI PANEL STUDY: BASELINE REPORT iv
(2002), at http.//www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410590_HOPEVIPanelStudy.pdf
Id. at 9-2. The residents affected by the program are often in as poor a condition as the
communities. Poor health is a common problem in these depressed areas. The poor conditions also affect
the children of the community, manifesting in low performing and racially and economically segregated
schools. To compound the problem, the families relocate frequently, taking away from the children any
chance of educational stability. Also to no surprise, well above the majority of the affected residents earn
below the poverty line and have high rates of unemployment. Many residents receive some form of
welfare assistance from the government.
8 1 LINDA B. FOSBURG, SUSAN J. POPKIN & GRETCHEN P. LOCKE, A HISTORICAL AND
BASELINE ASSESSMENT OF HOPE VI 3-28 (1996), at http:/Avww.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/hopevi
voll.pdf To begin the grant process, HUD publishes a notice of available funds. A PHA can then
prepare an application for these funds.
2007)
204 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 15:201
the plan.9 Once selected, a PHA must develop a revitalization plan, subject
to approval, which includes a budget and schedule for the redevelopment
project.'"
D. Funding
For three consecutive years, the Bush Administration drafted proposals
eliminating funding for the HOPE VI program. Congress has not gone this
far, but funding has nevertheless been cut significantly over the last few years
to where it now stands at $140 million." The large majority of the HOPE
VI monies go to the revitalization programs, but a portion of the grants go to
planning and demolition. 2
II. THE SCOTT/CARVER HOMES PROJECT
A. The Revitalization Plan
As stated earlier, the HOPE VI program has provided grants across the
country since 1992. The next portion of this paper will discuss one example
of a HOPE VI grant and the resulting problems it encountered. 3 Scott
Homes is a public housing development located in the Liberty City area of
Miami. Liberty City, one of the poorest areas in the city, has a median family
income well below the city average. 4 Some 800 low-income families, almost
exclusively black, lived in Scott Homes." However, Miami-Dade County
characterized the development as "extremely deteriorated, functionally
obsolete and beyond repair." 6 Consequently, in 1999, the Miami-Dade
9 Nat'l Low Income Hous. Coal., supra note 1.
Io Id.
II Id.
12 Id.
13 The Miami-Dade HOPE VI project is being used to highlight some of the problems common
to HOPE VI projects. This is not to suggest that every HOPE VI project turns out in this way. For more
case studies, see LARRY BURON ETAL., URBAN INSTITUTE, THE HOPE VI RESIDENT TRACKING STUDY:
A SNAPSHOT oF THE CURRENT LIVING SITUATION OF ORIGINAL RESIDENTS FROM EIGHT SITES 11
(2002), at http/www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410591_HOPEVIResTrack.pdf.
14 MARCOS FELDMAN &JEN WOLFE-BORUM, FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSIY, AFFORD-
ABLE HOUSING COST FOR FAmIES RESIDING IN LOW-INCOMEMIAMI-DADE NEIGHBORHOODS 4(2005),
at httpz/www.risep-fiu.org/reports/AffordableHousingCostFamilies LowlncDadeNeighborhoods .pdf
Is Miami-Dade Hous. Agency, Scott Homes and Carver Homes: HOPE VI Revitalization Plan-
Revised Plan (July 2004).
16 Id.
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Housing Agency (MDHA) applied for a HOPE VI Community
Revitalization Grant, which HUD approved.
17
The community of Liberty City, based on promises by MDHA, initially
supported the plan for redevelopment. These promises included the
establishment of social services programs and the prospect of new and
improved housing.'" That said, there were still many concerns about the
project. To realize the revitalization goals, the project required that a
substantial public housing development in a County already dealing with a
shortage of available public housing be destroyed. 9 Also, since African
Americans made up almost all of the current residents, it raised concerns
about inner city gentrification. Finally, as will be discussed below, the
project's makeup prevented a large number of the displaced residents from
moving back into the development once the project was finished. Residents
voiced these concerns in a complaint filed against the County of Miami-
Dade and MDHA, aiming to stop the HOPE VI demolition of Scott Homes.
The action failed and demolition proceeded in 2003.20
As mentioned above, the Scott Homes community housed over 800 low-
income families in dilapidated conditions, with a density of 15.9 units per
acre.2' The plan intended for the new housing not only to physically
improve the quality of the buildings but also to change the economic makeup
of the community, decreasing population density in the process. In order to
accomplish this, MDHA planned to replace the original 850 units with a total
of 411 units, varying both in form and in the number of occupants allowed.
Moreover, a large number of these units would not be designated as public
housing but as affordable housing, and thus would be sold privately upon
completion. 22 Simply based on the numbers presented above, over half of
the occupants would not be able to return to the Scott Homes development
after the project's completion. In addition, MDHA had not determined how
many previous occupants would be restricted from returning based on the
extra costs associated with the new housing units.
17 Id.
18 Miami-Dade Hous. Agency, HOPE VI Grant Application (1999). Interviews with residents
of Scott Homes revealed that in preparation for the HOPE VI application and to get the residents of Scott
Homes behind the proposed project, the residents were bused to Atlanta, GA to take a look at a completed
HOPE VI project there. Id.
19 The Miami-Dade waiting list for public housing released in the fall of 2005 had in excess of
40,000 names. Miami-Dade Hous. Agency, Waiting List (Oct. 2006), at http://www.miamidade.gov/
housingwaitlist.asp.
20 Reese v. Miami-Dade County, 2003 WL 22430313 (11th Cir.,Jan. 29, 2003).
21 Miami-Dade Hous. Agency, Scott Homes and Carver Homes: HOPE VI Revitalization Plan -
Revised Plan (July 2004).
22 Id.
20071
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In selling the HOPE VI plan, besides promising temporary housing to
the displaced residents, the MDHA also promised numerous community
services.2 MDHA planned to provide homeownership training along with
credit and counseling services. 24  Additionally, the employment and job
training services played an important role in the passage of the Scott Homes
Project. These particular services had over $3 million earmarked for their
implementation. Miami-Dade County, along with several educational
institutions, promised to provide job and educational training to eligible
residents. Additionally, the HOPE VI Grant enlisted the help of private
entities, in order to facilitate residents in obtaining employment through the
provision of business clothing and dental work. In its employment initiative,
MDHA obtained commitments from a number of local businesses, which
promised to provide employment to jobless residents. Also, in order to
further the employment program, the plan budgeted in excess of $2 million
to the Miami-Dade Department of Human Services for childcare services.25
B. Updated Situation
As of October of 2006, seven years since the initiation of the project, the
status of Scott Homes is discouraging. MDHA's latest report lists site work
and infrastructure now underway, but despite three years passing since the
demolition phase began, the construction of only five units has begun with
the help of Habitat for Humanity, and none of those are public housing.26
Due to these setbacks, the MDHA has now split the project into two phases.
The first phase includes 57 affordable units, which will be finished by the
beginning of 2008, at the earliest.27 Meanwhile, the updated plan schedules
the construction of housing available for sale to eligible homeowners to begin
23 Id. MDHA promised to provide administrative services and case management to better meet
the needs of the residents. See the Uniform Relocation Act of 1970 and the Quality Housing and Work
Responsibility Act of 1998, which require the provision of temporary housing for households displaced
by a federal program.
24 This may have been a questionable proposal, considering that Scott Homes residents were
mostly very-low-income people who qualified for public housing. However, coupled with other services,
including employment and job training, the program becomes feasible.
25 Miami-Dade Hous. Agency, Scott Homes HOPE VI Revitalization Plan: Program Services Matrix
(July 2004); Miami-Dade Hous. Agency, HOPE VI Community and Supportive Services Work Plan (July
2004).
26 Miami-Dade Hous. Agency, HOPE VI News: A Publication for the Scott & Carver Homes
Community, Fall 2005, at http://www.miamidade.gov/housing/library/Newsletters/HOPE-VI-fall05.pdf
7 Miami-Dade Hous. Agency, Scott/Carver Homes HOPE VI Revitalization Program Highlights
& Fact Sheet (Oct. 2006), at http/www.miamidade.gov/housing/library/hopevi fact sheet.pdf.
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in the summer of 2008.28 The plan projects that 160 public housing units
will be built during phase two.29 By the project's completion, 351 affordable
units will be built, mixing single-family homes with town homes.3"
Because of the delayed onset of the building phase, the status of the
homeownership program cannot be evaluated. As mentioned previously,
some serious questions exist about whether a family qualified to live in
public housing will ever be able to buy a home in a market like that of
Miami.
The success or failure of the Community and Supportive Services aspect
has also been difficult to judge. However, one gains some perspective
through examining Miami-Dade's claim that of the over 1200 displaced
adults, only 347 found jobs.z" Overall, the ex-residents of Scott Homes
report a general dissatisfaction with the HOPE VI program.32 This
frustration derives from the empty lot where their homes used to be, their
likely inability to move back when complete, and what they perceive as
broken promises by MDHA.
H. THE PROBLEMS ARISING wITH HOPE VI GRANTS
Despite its commendable objectives, the HOPE VI program in
application has encountered a number of problems. Disconcertingly, these
problems exist independent of the constant reduction in budget, as they are
merely a byproduct of an innately flawed program.
A. The Displacement of More Households than can Return
Initially the HOPE VI program required a one-for-one replacement of
targeted public housing, meaning that for every destroyed public housing
unit, a new one must be built. However, Congress repealed this requirement
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 For the latest information regarding the Miami-Dade HOPE VI project, see MDHA's website
at http://www.miamidade.gov/housing/hope6.asp.
31 Miami-Dade Hous. Agency, Scott-Carver Homes HOPE VI Revitalization Program High-
lights & Fact Sheet (Jan. 31, 2006).
32 Former Scott/Carver residents created grassroots organizations in an attempt to obtain more
services from MDHA. Teamed with local nonprofits, they have harshly criticized the handling of HOPE
VI in Miami-Dade. For more information, see Andrea Robinson, Opponents of HOPE VI Redevelopment
Plan Gain Allies, The Miami Herald (Feb. 7, 2003); Susan Eastman, Our Lady of the Projects
Octavia Anderson and the last days of the James E. Scott Homes, Miami New Times (July 5, 2001); Gaspar
Gonzalez, Native Son Billy Hardemon has been running around Liberty City, and away from allegations
of wrongdoing, forever, Miami New Times (June 20,2002).
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in 1996.33 Since then, PHAs have demolished public housing units at a rate
much greater than that of replacement.34 Considering the HOPE VI
program in isolation, this change in policy has resulted in a net loss of
available public housing nationwide.35 In turn, public housing waiting lists
have increased nationwide to the point where, on average, an eligible family
must wait approximately one year for a public housing unit.36 Over the last
decade and a half, there has been a declining supply of affordable housing
available to households with the lowest income.37 Whereas affordable
housing to families considered "low income" actually increased in the 1990's,
families classified as "very low income" saw availability of affordable housing
drop drastically. 38 During that time, HUD estimates that affordable housing
to households earning 50% of the average median income (AMI) decreased
by 8%, or by nearly 1.3 million units nationally.39 Compounding that fact,
only about 70% of these affordable units are actually available to the "very
low income" families, as households making more money than these truly
destitute family units may occupy the cheaper units.'1 Therefore, by not
requiring a one-for-one replacement, HOPE VI actually contributes to an
already serious problem.
HUD justified the change in policy requiring the one for one
replacement of public housing by championing the mixed-income
development model.4  The mixed-income model is designed to
economically integrate communities by moving higher income families into
a revitalized area. Through housing vouchers, this model allows some of the
33 FOSBURG, POPKIN & LOCKE, supra note 8 at 5-4.
34 See NAT'L Hous. LAwPROJECT ET AL., FALSE HOPE: A CRITICALASsESSMENT OF THE HOPE
VI PUBLIC HOUSING REDEVELOPMENTPROGRAM 2-7 (2002), at http://www.nhlp.org/htmVpubhsg/false
hope.pdf.
35 The importance of public housing to very-low-income communities is not the focus of this
paper, however, providing housing to very-low-income families at 30% of their income is one of the few
programs which provides individuals of that socioeconomic status a viable opportunity to live affordably.
36 See U.S. Dep't ofHous. and Urban Dev., Waiting in Vain:An Update on America's Rental Housing
Crisis (Mar. 1999) (on file with author).
37 HUD considers families with an income at or below 50% of the area median income to be of
"very low income" and thus qualified for public housing assistance.
38 See Kathryn P. Nelson, Testimony before the House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee
on Housing and Community Opportunity, U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., at httpV//financialservices.
house.gov/media/pdf/050301ne.pdf.
39 Id.
40 NAT'L HOUS. LAW PROJECT ET AL., FALSE HOPE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE HOPE
VI PUBLIC HOUSING REDEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 9 (2002), at http://www.nhlp.org/html/pubhsg/False
HOPE.pdf.
41 Jill Khadduri, Deconcentration: What Do We Mean? What Do We Want?, 5 CITYSCAPE:J. OF POL'Y
DEV. & RES. 69 (2001), availableat http://www.huduser.org/periodicals/cityscpe/vol3num2/unanswer.pdf.
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displaced residents to move into other communities in better condition.4 2
HUD implements this mixed-income model by setting aside an amount of
units, which must be dispersed, to families with varying income levels.
HUD recommends a composition of approximately one-third public
housing, one-third subsidized affordable housing for "low-income" families,
but not the "very low income" families, and one-third sold at market rate.43
HUD claims that the mixed-income model and social integration yields
many benefits. The goal of economic integration is to "reduce the social
pathology caused by the concentration" of lower income households.' In
addition, the integration allows for the higher income residents to become
a positive influence on the residents with a lower income. The higher
income families also bring with them more services and amenities to the
entire community, which results in a social benefit for all.45
These benefits aside, the nature of the mixed-income model coupled
with HUD's preference for it affects the residents displaced by the HOPE
VI project. Many of them cannot move back into the revitalized
communities. So, these households, displaced in the name of social benefit,
may not in reality be receiving any benefit. HUD does not keep adequate
records of the HOPE VI projects, or their impact on displaced residents; but
an independent study by the Urban Institute estimates that only between 14
to 40% of the displaced residents move back.46 This appears to be in line
with the HUD mixed-income model targeting around one-third of the new
units to be designated as public housing.
Given the decrease in available public housing, it must be determined
whether the benefits of the mixed-income model are worth the associated
drawbacks. Little evidence demonstrating the actual benefits of these mixed-
income developments exists.47 Further, [t]here is no strong evidence that it
is even possible to artificially create a community where people interact
rather than a development or neighborhood where people of different
42 Id.
43 Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., Notice of FundingAvailability: Revitalization of Severely Distressed
Housing Fiscal Year 2002 (July 2002), at http://www.novoco.con-Lowincome-housing/resourcefiles/
huddata/HOPEVINOFA_02.pdf
4 Paul C. Brophy & Rhonda N. Smith, Mixed-Income Housing: Factors for Success, 3 CrrYsCAPE:
J. OF POL'YDEv. & REs. 3,5-6 (1997), available at http://www.huduser.org/periodicals/cityscpe/vol3num2/
success.pdf.
45 Id. at 6. Regarding the Miami-Dade project, MDHA states that the project will reduce the
concentration of poverty in Liberty City by lowering the density of the on-site housing units by 56% along
with the general theoretical benefits mentioned above. See Miami-Dade Hous. Agency, supra note 27.
46 BURON ET AL., supra note 13, at ii..
47 Susan J. Popkin et al., The Gautreaux Legacy: What Might Mixed-Income and Dispersal Strategies
Mean for the Poorest Public Housing Tenants?, 11 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 911 (2000).
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income levels simply share the same physical space.4" Furthermore, some of
the benefits that HUD cites could be achieved without the mixed-income
model if the HOPE VI more adequately implemented the community and
supportive services aspects of the project. The services and amenities that
higher income residents supposedly bring could simply be provided to the
low-income community as part of the HOPE VI grant. Alternatively, mixed-
income communities could be formed naturally by offering the very-low-
income residents employment opportunities in the implementation of the
HOPE VI project. 49
Because of the problem discussed above, an evaluation of HOPE VI's
success depends largely on HUD's definition of community. As stated
earlier, the HOPE VI program is intended to revitalize targeted
communities50 But is a "community" under the HOPE VI objectives
defined as the actual area of land where the public housing sits, or the
families that inhabit it? If HUD focuses its concern on the actual area, then
a mixed-income model may appropriately offer a solution. The severely
distressed physical community itself will be revitalized both physically and
socially. Not being the primary concern, the displaced residents' inability to
return to the revitalized community is a tolerable externality. If, however, by
"community" HUD refers to the residents themselves, then a mixed-income
development model that results in the reduced availability of public housing
is problematic. The HOPE VI project does not make a large portion of the
"community" any better off because the project serves only to displace its
members.
B. Targeting Problems
As stated above, the HOPE VI program came about based on the report
of the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing.5 ' The
Commission identified severely distressed public housing around the
country and made recommendations to address the problem. 2 Hence,
Congress originally created HOPE VI to revitalize only the most severely
distressed housing, as opposed to public housing in general.
48 Id. at 928.
49 This paper does not intend to debate the merits of the mixed-income model, but it does
recognize that currently HUD has placed that model's implementation as a higher priority than the
provision of public housing.
so POPKIN ET AL., supra note 6.
51 Nat'l Low Income Hous. Coal., supra note 1.
52 Id.
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However, this original purpose has not been strictly followed in large
part because HUD lacks a concrete definition of severely distressed public
housing.5 3 While HUD itself defined and classified such housing numerous
times, in practice, the definitions do not even matter anymore.54 In order to
be eligible for a HOPE VI grant, a PHA must simply certify that the targeted
development is severely distressed and then hire an architect to support the
classification." In a report published by the General Accounting Office
(GAO), it was noted that in recent years HOPE VI has been less focused on
the most isolated and severely distressed communities and more upon
smaller communities, that while still distressed, are located in areas in which
private interests are more likely to invest.56 HUD has admitted to this shift
in its response to the GAO report."7 "[T]he funds have largely been used to
replace housing that could be repaired, but which for one reason or another,
HUD officials believe should be destroyed. A classic example can be found
in the Atlanta development. The diverted HUD funds helped influential
leaders in Atlanta build housing for the Olympics and remove a perceived
blight on the sparkling city."
This HUD policy leads to obviously negative effects. The communities
that receive attention do not necessarily need it the most. The targeting
problem compounds the displacement problem discussed earlier. HOPE VI
projects demolish public housing units that potentially could be repaired, and
in their place, fewer units are constructed. HUD's failure to enforce a clear
definition of severely distressed housing allows PHA's to use HOPE VI
monies not only to reduce the overall number of public housing units in a
community, but also to reduce the number of salvageable public housing
communities in a municipality.
53 See Lawrence J. Vale, Beyond the Problem Projects Paradigm: Defining and Revitalizing "Severely
Distressed" Public Housing, 4 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 147, 152 (1993), available at http://www.fanniemae
foundation.org/programs/hpd/pdf/hpd 0402_vale.pdf.
54 Id.
5 DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEv., SUPPLEMENT TO THE FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2006
SUPERNOFA FOR HUD'S DISCRETIONARY PROGRAMS 20-21, March 8, 2006, at http://www.hud.gov/
offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/grants/fy06/revwdeadline.doc.
56 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, HOPE VI
PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS IN REVITALIZING DISTRESSED PUBLIC HOUSING 25 (July 1998) at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/rc98187.pdf.
57 U.S. Dep't of'Hous. and Urban Dev., NationwideAudit: HOPE VI Urban Revitalization Preogram
13-14 (Dec. 1998), at http://www.hud.gov/oig/ig960001.pdf.
58 Fitzpatrick, Michael. A Disaster in Every Generation: An Analysis of HOPE VI: HUD's Newest Big
Budget Development Plan, 7 GEO.J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 421, 443 (2000).
2007]
212 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 15:201
C. Ineffective Implementation
As the problems discussed in the previous two sections show, the HOPE
VI program has not met its stated objectives. The Urban Institute conducted
a study of eight HOPE VI sites in order to track the displaced residents and
the program's effect on them. 9 Of the households surveyed, 19% lived in
the revitalized HOPE VI development, 29% lived public housing elsewhere,
33% rented units else with the assistance of housing vouchers, and 18% no
longer relied on assisted living.?'
The study shows that the majority of residents, approximately 56%, have
experienced improved housing conditions since the relocation.6' Obviously,
the households that returned to the HOPE VI development enjoyed the
improved conditions the most. Those residents now renting with the
housing vouchers reported much less satisfaction with their new residence. 62
Further, the study found that the displaced families have been dispersed
among many different communities, but as a whole families now live in areas
with lower poverty rates than that of their original communities.' Still, a
significant portion of the households surveyed reported problems with drugs,
gangs and crime in their new community.64
The report concludes on this note: a HOPE VI project results in the
improvement in housing conditions and neighborhood conditions for the
majority of households. However, a very significant portion of the displaced
residents, especially those unable to return to the original development, face
serious problems in their new locations. These include problems with crime
and an increased difficulty in meeting their expenses.65  The overall
conclusion is that, "there is no evidence that as a group original residents are
worse off as a result of HOPE VI, and indeed most are considerably better
off as a result of the changes associated with leaving."66
This conclusion reveals a fundamental problem with the HOPE VI
program, that only half of the affected families see the improved housing
conditions. Thus Hope VI, a program aimed at revitalizing the entire
community is failing to achieve a main objective.
59 BURON FT AL., supra note 13, at i.
6 Id. at ii.
61 Id. at iii.
62 Id. at iv.
63 Id. at v.
64 Id.
65 Id.
6 Id. at viii.
HOPE VI REVITALIZATION GRANTS
Other problems with the implementation of a HOPE VI project include
the exclusion of the residents from participation in the process itself.
Existing policies supposedly require that the residents be given an
opportunity to participate in the HOPE VI plan. The policies require PHAs
applying for funding to hold resident training sessions and public meetings
even before a HOPE VI application is submitted.67 Unfortunately for the
residents, HUD has not provided mechanisms to enforce these requirements
upon a non-complaint PHA. This lack of recourse can be attributed to
HUD's refusal to issue formal regulations for HOPE VI. 68 So, without
regulations or clear rules for the program, public participation has been
frustrated.69 In place of the regulations, HUD administers the program
through notices of funding availability and grant agreements.7' These grant
agreements do indeed spell out the rights of the affected community, but do
not provide for enforcement by the community residents.
Inevitably, problems arise for residents because the actual revitalization
process may differ greatly from that originally proposed in the application.7
For example, while a P-A must include public participation in the original
plan and application, once HUD has approved the project, the P1HA can then
substantially change it.72 Thus, yet again, the residents do not have recourse
against the changed plan if a PHA chooses to terminate public participation.
The HOPE VI program intends to improve the living environment of
the targeted public housing residents. However, these residents
unfortunately do not always receive the intended benefits. As discussed
above, relatively few of the residents displaced by the project are ever able to
return to the revitalized housing. Moreover, the displaced residents face
additional hardships. First, residents have very little control about where
they are relocated. Families generally relocate to other public housing or are
provided with housing vouchers. It appears that the PHA loses track of as
many as 20% of the displaced families.73 This means that in the process of
displacement and relocation the PHA has lost track of a household, which
occurs at the time the household stops receiving housing assistance.
Harassment, neglect, and exclusionary screening policies all contribute to
these families becoming lost to the PHAs which are responsible for them.74
67 NAT'L HOUS. LAW PROJECT ET AL., supra note 40, at 17.
68 Id. at 18.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 19.
7 Id.
73 Id. at 26.
74 Id.
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Lastly, the community and supportive services that HUD markets with
each HOPE VI project have not been provided to the extent promised.
HOPE VI promises to provide these services to all of the families living in
the targeted community when the HOPE VI process begins.7 ' However, in
reality this does not occur. HUD primarily focuses the services on the
families who live and then return to the actual site, where the newly installed
and revitalized infrastructure supports the services.7 6 Thus, a family that
cannot return to a site does not benefit from the redevelopment and the
services it supports. This inequality is compounded by an overall decrease
in the provision of supportive services. 77 Moreover, as mentioned before, the
amount of HOPE VI grants have been reduced in recent years.78 All of these
factors have resulted in the HOPE VI program providing fewer community
and supportive services than that which was originally intended.
The problems implementing HOPE VI grants, which were discussed in
this section, along with the problems discussed earlier, reveal that HOPE VI
in its current form is not effectively meeting its objectives. These problems
can be further illustrated by examining how they have manifested in the
HOPE VI project currently underway in Miami.
IV. THE NEXT STEP
As discussed above, there are several problems with the HOPE VI
program. Many have suggested that HOPE VI itself, because of its inherent
problems, should be eliminated.79 Others, like the Bush Administration,
believe that HOPE VI has effectively run its course and is now moot.s° The
first question then must be whether HOPE VI is worth fixing at all. Perhaps
the whole program should be scrapped in favor of a new methodology for
revitalizing poor communities.
A. HOPE VI Cannot be Abandoned
The HOPE VI program is replete with problems. Because of its vague
mandate and a change in political sentiment, HOPE VI's original purpose of
7 U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., HOPE Vh. Community Building Makes a Difference (Mar.
2005), at http//www.huduser.org/publications/pubasst/hope2.html.
76 NAT'L Hous. LAw PROJECT ET AL., supra note 40, at 28.
77 Id. at 29 (evidence of this decrease can be seen in the dropping percentage of grants used for
such services, down to 9% currently from the original 13%).
78 See Nat'l Low Income Hous. Coal.,, supra note 1.
79 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 58.
0 Nat'l Low Income Hous. Coal.,, supra note 1.
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revitalizing the nation's most severely depressed public housing seems to
have been forgotten. Instead, HOPE VI has targeted communities not
always in need of revitalization by basing its selection process on factors such
as desirability to developers. Furthermore, to meet the needs of the private
developers and HUD's mixed-income model, HOPE VI has allowed for the
displacement of thousands of low-income families. Nevertheless, HOPE
VI is a program worth saving.
President Bush asked Congress to eliminate HOPE VI in an attempt to
reduce the federal government's role in affordable housing."' The
Administration claimed that HOPE VI served its purpose and that more
effective yet less costly alternatives exist for the revitalization of public
housing.8
2
Despite the Administration's claim, HOPE VI has not fully served its
purpose, as the problem of distressed public housing communities is still
rampant. In a recent study, the Urban Institute strongly recommended for
the continuation of the HOPE VI program despite its problems.83 HOPE VI
is virtually the only federal program that provides for the revitalization of
very-low-income communities by rebuilding the housing and bringing in
new opportunities that reform the community. These new opportunities
include supermarkets, stores, parks, schools and recreational facilities. s4
Additionally, HOPE VI provides employment opportunities and supportive
services that may not reach everyone, but still serve at least those who return
to the community.
Conceding its weaknesses, HOPE VI has still supported and improved
the condition of a portion of the families in a targeted community. Absent
HOPE VI, no federal program would have provided help. To its credit, the
program has embraced the market by leveraging private investments, thus
enabling it to not rely solely on government money in order to achieve its
goals.85 This has created a flexible investment initiative geared toward the
81 Id.
82 Id. The Bush Administration claims that the average HOPE VI unit costs $120,000 to rebuild
whereas the average unit under the HOME program costs $80,000. Id.
83 See POPRIN Er AL., supra note 3, at 47.
84 Renue L. Glover, Making a Case for Mixed-Use, Mixed Income Communities to Address America's
Affordable Housing Need, Presentation to Ctr. for Am. Progress 4 (Oct. 12, 2005), at
http://www.americanprogress.org/atf/cf/%7BE9245FE4-9A2B-43C7-A52 1-
5D6FF2E06E03%7D/glover.pdf.
85 HarryJ. Wexler, HOPE VI: Market Means/Public Ends- The Goals, Strategies, and Midterm Lessons
of HUD's Urban Revitalization Demonstration Program, 10J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEv.
L. 195, 213-16 (2001).
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improvement of public and affordable housing in a given community. 6 The
fact that HOPE VI has been in place and working for years and has
substantially met its goals of improving the conditions of certain blighted
communities shows its worth. Also, if HOPE VI were eliminated, PHAs
trying to redevelop communities in depressed areas would have no leverage
to bring about private funding.
B. The One-for-One Replacement Solution
The practice of constructing mixed-income developments generates an
overall loss of affordable housing with every approved project. In 1998,
HUD reported the scheduled demolition of 11,538 units. Only some 5,541
units were scheduled to be built in their place; of those, approximately one-
third were likely to be slated to be subsidized as public housing.87 In light of
this statistic and the national shortage of affordable housing, there have been
recommendations that, "[a]ll public housing rental units affected by
demolition or redevelopment should be replaced with new or redeveloped
public housing rental units on a one-for-one basis."88 The replacement units
could be built on the HOPE VI site or off-site, so long as the off-site units
enjoyed access to the same services8 9
The one-for-one replacement solution is inadequate for two reasons.
First, such solution would be financially infeasible based on the current
structure of the HOPE VI program. As mentioned above, the HOPE VI
program works because the HUD grant allows a PHA to leverage other
funding. Especially with the increasing budget cuts passed down by
Congress, PHAs have been forced to come up with mixed finance models to
fund the HOPE VI projects. The new trend for these models uses public
86 MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET. AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, WHAT NEXT FOR DISTRESSED
PUBLIC HOUSING? (2004), at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID= 1000654.
87 Sabrina L. Williams, From HOPE VI to HOPE SICK?, DOLLARS & SENSE: THE MAGAZINE OF
ECONOMIC JUSTICE July/August 2003, available at http://www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/2003/0703
williams.html.
88 NAT'L HOUS. LAW PROJECT ET AL., supra note 40, at 15. In Atlanta's Techwood project 1081
units were demolished and 360 replaced on the site, of which 72 were public housing. In Los Angeles's
Pico Aliso project 481 units were replaced with 265. Williams, supra note 87.
89 NAT'LHoUS. LAW PROJECT ETAL.,supra note 40, at 15. Communities can always individually
negotiate with PHA's in the pursuit of one-for-one replacement. In 1996, residents of the North Beach
public housing development worked out a contract with the San Francisco Housing Authority that
guarantees the residents one-for-one replacement of demolished low income units. James Tracy, Tenant
Organizing Wins One-for-One Replacement (Jan/Feb. 2000), at http://www.nhi.org/onlineissues/109/
organize.html.
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and private funds to spawn the development.' A PHA will combine low-
income housing tax credits and private loans with the HOPE VI grant.9' In
some cases, the combined funds even exceed the original grant.92 The use of
leveraging allows the PHAs to form partnerships with public agencies and
private organizations. An example of a PHA effectively using combined
funding sources to develop a community is Centennial Place in Atlanta. In
that development, the HOPE VI grant money funded the public housing
units, the low-income tax credits financed the low to moderate-income
units, and the private funding was used to build the market rate units.93
As mentioned above, there is less money available for new projects than
ever before, which forces PHAs to leverage other resources just to complete
the project. These other sources, as is the growing trend, will often include
Low Income Tax Credits, used when a partnership forms with private
developers. Low Income Tax Credits however have limits; they can provide
housing for low-income households, but not public housing. Requiring the
development of public housing using the tax credits would generate a
significant loss for developers, scaring potential partners away. And, in one-
for-one replacement, the developers have no opportunity to recoup their
losses by the production of market-rate units. Even taking Low Income Tax
Credits out of the equation, the replacement policy suggested by some would
eliminate developers' incentive to partner with PHAs, as any potential for
profit will have been eliminated.94
A second reason that a one-for-one replacement policy is an
inappropriate solution is that it takes away any benefits associated with the
mixed-income model. The mixed-income model promotes two goals that
should not be abandoned. First, it furthers the de-concentration of poverty,
and second, it promotes the self-sufficiency of communities.
Mixed-income communities break the traditional mold of clustered low-
income neighborhoods. These clustered communities were isolated in their
poverty and left to decline. The mixed-income model attracts higher income
residents into a community, and these higher income residents bring with
them the public and private resources mentioned earlier. In theory, even the
90 Wexler, supra note 85, at 213-214.
91 Id. at 214. The Low Income Housing Tax Credit provides a tax credit to investors willing to
develop units affordable at particular income levels.
92 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 56, at 21.
93 Id. at 21; See the Kennedy Brothers Memorial project in El Paso and the Ellen Wilson project
in Washington DC for other examples of how PHA's are using mixed finance models to fund HOPE VI
projects.
94 There are also arguments that insertion of private finding in HOPE VI projects is good for the
effectiveness of the program. It is argued that private investment creates incentives for more effective
management. For more on this, see TURNER ET AL., supra note 86.
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displaced households have an opportunity to relocate into better com-
munities, through the utilization ofhousing vouchers.95 However, given the
difficulty a family may face in finding a landlord who accepts the voucher
and the fact that mixed-income communities may not be widespread
throughout a municipality, this theory is innately flawed.
The influx of services into a mixed-income community establishes self-
sufficiency in residents previously living in hopeless conditions. -Further-
more, new schools and employment opportunities instill this change. An
example of self-sufficiency and community-wide change can be seen in
Atlanta where an elementary school sits where distressed public housing
once did. The school obviously provides for the children in the revitalized
community, employment among assisted families has increased, and crime
has been reduced by 90%.96 While the mixed-income model has some
drawbacks because it excludes certain residents from any real benefit, these
new communities begin to combat the concentrated poverty in urban
America, and promote the self-sufficiency of once hopeless communities.
The mixed-income model is the base from which a solution to HOPE VI's
problems may be found.
C. The Inclusionary Zoning Solution
The most significant deficiency of the HOPE VI program is the
reduction in affordable housing that a project creates. As mentioned, because
a segment of the displaced residents cannot return, HOPE VI ends up
straining the supply of affordable housing across a municipality. Therefore,
any proposal to fix HOPE VI must address this problem directly by
providing a supply of affordable housing outside of the targeted development
area. Because of the funding constraints discussed earlier, the potential to
change the HOPE VI project is limited. The best solution for HOPE VI may
be to change the eligibility criteria for targeted communities.
I propose that HUD, in selecting an applicant PHA for a grant, should
require that there be in place an independent mechanism that provides
affordable housing to a municipality and its residents. A number of such
policies exist that may be utilized in a locality, but that which will be the
focus of the remainder of this paper is inclusionary zoning. If HUD
required a municipality to have an appropriate inclusionary zoning
ordinance, or something generating the same effect, then some of HOPE
VI's problems could be mitigated.
95 Ngai Pindell, Is There Hope for HOPE VI?: Community Economic Development and Localism, 35
CONN. L. REv. 385, 415 (2003).
% Glover, supra note 84, at 6.
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"Inclusionary Housing Programs promote the production of affordable
housing by requiring residential developers to set aside a certain percentage
of the housing units in a proposed development to be priced affordable to
low and moderate income households." 97 Such ordinances have been put
into effect for two main purposes, which include the economic integration
of communities and the overall increase in affordable housing for the entire
municipality.98  Inclusionary Zoning's purpose of economic integration
follows in line with HOPE VI's emphasis of the mixed-income model,
similarly based on the rationale that economic integration allows low-income
families to live in better neighborhoods and improve their access to jobs, the
quality of schools, and the availability of other amenities.99 An increase in the
supply of affordable housing would directly combat HOPE VI's biggest
problem.
Inclusionary zoning originated in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan
area in the 1970's.'00 Since then, it has gained widespread appeal and
ordinances have popped up across the country, especially in California and
Massachusetts.'0 ' Throughout the years, these ordinances have faced
constitutional challenges, but can be fashioned to survive such scrutiny. 2
Some important elements of an inclusionary zoning policy are the set aside
requirements, the income targeted, the alternatives to compliance, and the
period of affordability.'03 Inclusionary zoning is not one size fits all; each
municipality has to design a policy to suit its own needs. That being said, I
will offer some suggestions for an inclusionary zoning program that would
be appropriate for the needs created by a HOPE VI project.
The set aside requirement is simply the percentage of units that a
developer must make affordable." The typical set aside requirement is
between ten and twenty-five percent.' ° Obviously the higher set aside a
municipality requires, the more affordable units that will be created. That
97 MARY ANDERSON, BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL PEOPLE FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST,
REGIONAL INCLUSIONARY HOUSING INITIATIVE, OPENING THE DOOR TO INCLUSIONARY HOUSING
3, at http'//www.bpichicago.org/ra/pubs/opening_the-door.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2007).
98 Id.at 4.
99 Id.
100 Nico Calavita, Inclusionary Zoning: The California Experience: Introduction, 3 NHC AFFORDABLE
HOUSING POL'Y REV. 1 (2004), available at http'/www.nhc.org/pdf/pubahp_02_04.pdf.
tol Id. at 2.
102 See Deborah Collins & Michael Rawson, Inclusionary Zoning: The California Experience: Avoiding
Constitutional Challenges to Inclusionary Zoning, 3 NHC AFFORDABLE HOUSING POLY REV. 32, 32-37
(2004), available at http'//www.nhc.org/pdf/pubahp_02_04.pdf.
103 ANDERSON, supra note 97, at 5-6.
104 Id. at 10.
105 Id. at 10-11.
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being said, the income level targeted, as well as alternatives to compliance,
will play a large role in fixing the set aside level correctly. Going hand in
hand with the set aside requirement, a municipality must decide what levels
of income it intends to target. The income levels are based on the area mean
income (AMI) and can range from below 50% to 120% AMI and beyond.10 6
Again, as the targeted income level is lowered, the set aside requirement must
be decreased accordingly or there must be some other modification to
balance the increased cost to developers.
Because HOPE VI projects revamp the most severely distressed
communities, the housing lost is traditionally that of very-low-income
families. Therefore, an inclusionary zoning program will address the HOPE
VI-created problem only if it can provide affordable units for very-low-
income households. To this end, it would be most effective for a
municipality to target income levels at or below 50% AMI. Now, as
mentioned above, targeting an income this low will affect the rest of the
policy to offset some of the costs developers will face. Thus, the set aside
requirement may be lower than average so as to compensate for the income
targeted.
A developer should be offered alternative methods of compliance because
it may not always be feasible to include the targeted percentage of affordable
housing units in a given development. The two most common compliance
alternatives are the allowance of in-lieu fees and off-site units in place of the
on-site affordable units."0 7 Allowing the building of the affordable units at
a different location has both positive and negative aspects. It is contrary to
one of the goals of inclusionary zoning, doing nothing to economically
integrate a municipality. On the other hand, the off-site affordable units are
still affordable and increase the overall supply of such housing. In addition,
off-site units may be built at a cheaper price therefore more than the original
set aside may be required. Some municipalities require a certain percentage
of units to be built on-site allowing the remaining to be built elsewhere, a
flexible alternative for the builders; others require municipality approval
before units can be built off-site.
A municipality may also allow a developer to make a payment instead of
building the required affordable housing. This payment is usually put into
a trust fund, which theoretically is used for future affordable housing or
assistance to families needing housing.108 An indispensable consideration in
the setting of in-lieu fees is that the fees should be high enough so that
developers have an incentive to build the affordable units. Very low fees can
106 Id. at 23-24.
107 Id. at 17-18.
108 Id. at 18.
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result in all developers opting for this alternative, causing the goal of
economic integration not to be met.1°9 For this option, the municipality
must have plans to administer and utilize the fees and trust fund. Otherwise,
affordable units may never be built, undermining the goal to increase such
housing in the locality."' Municipalities may determine the in-lieu fees
using a number of formulas.'
For an ordinance designed with HOPE VI in mind, a municipality
should offer developers incentives to comply with the ordinance.' 2  A
municipality should also allow developers alternatives to strict compliance.
Both alternatives discussed above are appropriate. While in-lieu fees do not
further the inclusionary zoning goals, the fees do allow for a housing trust
fund, which a PHA could use to build more affordable units within a HOPE
VI project or, if necessary, elsewhere. The off-site alternative usually serves
to increase the supply of affordable units. However, as the off-site is not
ideal, for this option to work a higher numbers of units should be required
to compensate for its drawbacks." 3
The last aspect of inclusionary zoning that will be discussed here is the
length of time that the affordability requirements last. Few inclusionary
zoning programs require permanent affordability as most designate a period
of time, 20 years for example." 4 To ensure the units' affordability over time
a municipality includes resale restrictions. Resale restrictions take the form
of restrictive covenants, contractual agreements, and land trust
arrangements." 5 The two most common resale restrictions are price control
and right of first refusal. The price control mechanisms run with the land
and apply for a targeted amount of time. It restricts the sale price to an
109 Id. at 19-21.
110 Id.at 19.
See id. at 21. Some formulas are based on a unit's square footage, id.; others are based on the
projected value of the required affordable units or a part thereof NICK BRUNICKET AL., BUSINESS AND
PROFESSIONAL PEOPLE FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, LARGE CITIES AND INCLUSIONARY ZONING 14, at
http://www.bpichicago.org/rah/pubs/large-cities-iz.pdf.
112 There are a number of incentives that may be provided to developers to encourage building
by offsetting their losses caused by the required affordable housing. Seegenerally id. at 11-14, 23. The most
often used developer concession is the density bonus, which allows a developer to build more units on
a lot than would otherwise be permitted. Id. The additional market-rate units resulting from the density
bonus compensates the developer for the loss generated by the affordable units. Most localities set the
percentage of density bonus at or above the set aside requirement, but municipalities should also consider
their ability to deal with increased density. Id. at 13. Other incentives used by municipalities include: the
reduction of certain fees, modifying the parking requirement, flexibility on subdivision design, and the
expediting of permits. Id. at 13-14.
113 Id. at 17-18.
114 Id. at 37-38.
ns Id. at 39.
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affordable level, usually the purchase price adjusted for inflation and
improvements." 6  The right of first refusal allows the municipality to
purchase the unit either before it is placed on the market or after no eligible
buyer can be found."7
D. Counter Argument-Problems with the Indusionary Zoning Solution
There are a number of criticisms surrounding inclusionary zoning
policies. Generally, critics argue that providing an adequate supply of low-
income housing is a societal burden and inclusionary zoning shifts this
burden to private developers."' Another criticism is that inclusionary zoning
takes, "the most upwardly mobile poor from central neighborhoods and
artificially transports the citizens who could do the most for reviving central
city neighborhoods to the suburbs."" 9 Lastly, it has been maintained that
these policies cause developers to either raise housing prices or build less,
thus exacerbating the shortage of affordable housing. 2' Each criticism will
now be taken in turn.
The argument that inclusionary zoning unfairly places the burden of
supplying affordable housing on private entities is largely based on the
Constitutional challenges that inclusionary zoning has faced. However, with
numerous ordinances in place across the country, this policy has generally
been accepted as Constitutional.''
The next criticism mentioned above is that these ordinances isolate the
less mobile poor, as the more sophisticated citizens take advantage of the
benefits of inclusionary zoning and leave the blighted communities. This
criticism may be valid when directed solely at a policy ofinclusionary zoning.
However, when inclusionary zoning is coupled with a HOPE VI
revitalization grant targeting these blighted communities, these less mobile
poor will be directly benefited by HOPE VI, and any residents that are
displaced will be aided by the affordable housing supply created by the
zoning policy.
116 Id. at 32.
117 Id. at 40-41.
11 See Robert W. Burchell & Catherine C. Galley, Inclusionary Zoning: Pros and Cons, 1 NEW
CENTURY HOUSING 3, 7 (2000), available at http://www.ilsg.org/resource_files/20555.Part%201II.pdf.
119 Id.at 8.
120 Barbara Erlich Kautz, In Defense of Inclusionary Zoning: Successfully Creating Affordable Housing, 36
U.S.F. L. REV. 971, 983-85 (2002).
121 For a thorough discussion on the constitutionality ofinclusionary zoning see Cal. Affordable
Hous. Law Project of the Pub. Interest Law Project & W. Ctr. on Law and Poverty, Inclusionary Zoning:
Legal Issues (2002), at http://www.pilpca.org/docs/IZLEGAL-12.02.pdf.
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Perhaps the most debated issue regarding inclusionary housing is its
effect on the general housing market. Certainly there are arguments that
inclusionary zoning aggravates housing shortages. 12 However, numerous
case studies conducted in diverse locations like Boston, San Francisco, San
Diego, Chapel Hill, and Montgomery County, MD have shown that these
ordinances do not effect development negatively."2
The pairing of HOPE VI and inclusionary zoning raises some issues of
its own. First, HOPE VI, which is a federal grant program, and inclusionary
zoning, implemented at the local level, seem to lack any logical nexus. For
the federal government to require localities to legislate in a certain manner
seems to reek of federalism issues. However, the fact remains that HUD's
power to award HOPE VI money is discretionary. Municipalities interested
in the federal money must put together a plan and apply for the project
funds. This paper suggests that HUD be more discriminating in its awarding
of the grant money. Inclusionary zoning, per se, must not be required,
however, an applicant municipality must have in place some device that
generates a supply of low-income housing to offset the effects of HOPE VI.
Another potential criticism of pairing HOPE VI with the zoning policy
is that inclusionary zoning, especially with a lower set aside and the
compliance alternatives mentioned above, does not produce very much
affordable housing. Additionally, with inclusionary zoning, the most
difficult units to produce are those that are affordable to very-low-income
residents. In response, this paper suggests putting the onus on the PHA to
create an effective policy. A zoning ordinance will not completely provide
affordable housing for all of the very-low-income residents in a municipality,
nor will it likely be able to carry the burden of all of the residents displaced
by a typical HOPE VI project. Inclusionary zoning programs are not perfect.
Because of the compliance alternatives, the actual number of affordable units
that are produced is limited. 124 However, this just demonstrates that a
municipality must carefully fashion its policy and be amenable to change.
122 See Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of "Indusionary" Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167 (1981).
123 See NICHOLAS BRUNICK, Bus. AND PROF'L PEOPLE FOR THE PUB. INTEREST, THE IMPACT
OF INCLUSIONARYZONING ON DEVELOPMENT 5-8, at http://www.bpichicago.org/rah/pubs/impactiz_
development.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2007).
124 For case studies discussing how some inclusionary zoning policies have turned out see KAREN
DESTOREL BROWN, THE BROOKINGS INST. CTR. ON URBAN AND METRO. POLICY, EXPANDING
AFFORDABLE HOUSING THROUGH INCLUSIONARY ZONING: LESSONS FROM THE WASHINGTON
METROPOLITAN AREA (2001), at http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/publications/inclusionary.pdf;
Anderson, supra note 97, at 61-103; CAL. COAL. FOR RURAL HOUSING & NON-PROFIT HOUSING ASS'N
OF N. CAL., INCLUSIONARY HOUSING IN CALIFORNIA: 30 YEARS OF INNOVATION (2003), at
http://calruralhousing.org/Publications/Inclusionary30Years.pdf.
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Ifa municipality has in place an appropriate inclusionary zoning program
or the like before the HOPE VI award, much of the negative effect of the
project will be alleviated. Should this avenue be taken, there will be a
structure in place that can help to cushion the blow of hundreds of displaced
low-income families. Because of the ordinance, more affordable housing
will already exist, and there will be a stream of newly built affordable housing
as developers take on new projects. Because of the in-lieu fee alternative, the
municipality will have a growing housing trust fund with which to maintain
and supply affordable housing to the community.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress established the HOPE VI program to administer federal dollars
to revitalize the country's most severely distressed public housing. The
program has changed over time and is now supported by combined sources
of funding and often partnerships with private investors. The program
focuses on revamping poor communities by de-concentrating poverty and
installing mixed-income and self-sufficient developments in their place.
Unfortunately, in practice HOPE VI generates some significant problems.
Most disconcertingly, HOPE VI ends up displacing more households than
it rebuilds. This results in a net loss in the number of affordable housing in
a targeted municipality. Despite this problem and the others mentioned
within this Article, HOPE VI should not be abandoned, as it is the only
current federal program that revitalizes severely depressed areas.
Nevertheless, the problems must be addressed. A one-for-one replacement
of demolished units is not the answer because it would be infeasible
financially and it overlooks the benefits of the mixed-income model. An
effective solution would be to require a municipality wanting HOPE VI
money to have in place programs to provide affordable housing independent
of the HUD program. The paper highlights the policy of inclusionary
zoning, which would require developers to bear the burden of creating very-
low-income units and give PHAs the power to maintain an adequate supply
of affordable housing.
